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VALUATION OF INTERNATIONAL OIL COMPANIES 





High oil prices are normally expected to stimulate exploration and the development of new oil 
and gas fields. But over the last few years, financial analysts have focused strongly on short-
term accounting return (RoACE) for benchmarking and valuation, and this has led to high 
capital discipline among oil and gas companies. We analyse how high oil prices can be 
explained in terms of an implicit capacity game between the oil companies, and explore the 
stability of the current equilibrium. Our approach is an investigation of a key assumption 
among financial analysts, namely the presumed positive relation between RoACE and stock 
market valuation. Based on panel data for 11 international oil and gas companies, we seek to 
establish econometric relations between market valuation on one hand, and simple financial 
and operational indicators on the other. Our findings do not support the perceived positive 
relation between reported RoACE and market-based multiples. Recent evidence also suggests 
that the stock market is increasingly concerned about reserve replacement and sustained 
profitable growth. The current high-price equilibrium is therefore hardly stable.   
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The current high oil prices are being linked to the lack of investments in the oil sector. 
 
"I am disappointed about the shortfall of investments on the supply side. Large, international oil 
companies seem to prefer looking for oil at the NYMEX trading floor, instead of exploring for 
resources around the world. They have a social responsibility, but prefer to buy back their own 
shares," Fatih Birol, Chief Economist, International Energy Agency (IAE) 
 
To explain the recent high oil prices, both the supply- and the demand-side behaviour need to be 
taken into consideration. On the supply side, global exploration level has been low since 1998.  



















Figure 1:  Number of exploration wells in the USA versus oil price,  
1990-2003. Source: US Department of Energy 
 
 
Empirical research suggests that cash-flow variables dominate capital-cost variables in the 
explanation of investment behaviour. Oil and gas exploration is no exception. Current cash flows 
among oil and gas companies are fuelled by high oil and gas prices, and risky investments like 
exploration are usually funded by internal funds. Adaptive expectations may also cause price 








































































Brent Blend  3
expectations to increase in periods of high spot prices. However, the relationship between 
exploration activity and the oil price seems to have disintegrated over the last few years. Instead, 
the huge cash flows that have been built among oil and gas companies find their way back to 
investors, through increased dividends and share buyback programmes.  
At the same time, there has been an increasing focus in the oil industry on short term 
accounting profitability, or more precisely, Return on Average Capital Employed (RoACE), 
which is a vital input to valuation analyses done by investment banks. This indicator has its 
flaws.  RoACE is not neutral over a project’s life cycle. Inherent in the unit of production 
depreciation system in the oil sector, RoACE falls in the first years when new investments are 
undertaken. Later in the project cycle, RoACE will rise.  Reversely, RoACE is boosted in periods 
of divestment. The short-term negative effect on corporate income accounts is particularly strong 
for exploration expenses as only successful wells are capitalized; costs related to dry holes are 
expensed. As the lead times for exploration projects are generally long, the focus on short-term 
return on capital caused a shift in management attention to cost cutting and value-maximisation 
of existing reserves (efforts to increase oil recovery). 
In effect, the strong focus on RoACE by analysts and investment banks may therefore 
have put a cap on oil companies’ investment budgets. This would not have been the case if a 
reasonable trade-off were made between short-term profitability and long run growth 
(development of new reserves).  
The oil companies’ focus on RoACE, at the expense of organic reserve replacement, has 
the characteristics of an implicit co-ordination of capacity in the non-OPEC area. We should 
emphasise that we are not talking of a cartel in a traditional sense, as no collusion has taken 
place. Rather, our point is that the market outcome, of oil companies independently attempting to 
score on analysts’ rankings of financial indicators - in the particular period we analyse - has some 
of the same qualitative features as a production cartel.  
Another conclusion of our study is that the stock market seems not to have bought into the 
analysts’ tendency to over-weight RoACE. Investors are probably concerned that the short-term 
return on capital is unsustainable, and would therefore like a more balanced trade-off between 
short-term indicators like return on capital and long-term indicators like reserve replacement. 
There is now more focus on reserve replacement and signs of a higher risk acceptance for new 
projects. Thus, we do not perceive the market equilibrium of strong capital discipline and short-  4
term focus to be stable, i.e., the period 1997-2001 stands out as a fairly unique period of high 
cash flows and low investments.   
In this article we present and analyse financial indicators used in the petroleum industry 
and present previous literature. Furthermore, we try to ascertain if an equilibrium of low capacity 
is sustainable. To do so, we undertake econometric testing the actual relation between pricing 
multiples and financial indicators for oil companies, and test whether the presumed positive 
relationship between pricing multiples and RoACE actually exists. 
In presentations of their valuation techniques, investment banks often picture the 
relationship between market capitalisation (or EV/DACF) and a single financial indicator (like 
RoACE) in a diagram. They typically show this relationship for different companies at a given 
point of time. We take this approach a significant step further, by controlling for other variables 
that can influence the multiple – like reserves. Furthermore, we apply a panel data set that offers 
observations of the relationship over five years. Thereafter, we compare our findings with 
common analyst perceptions. 
 
2. A capacity game in the oil industry    
 
In the vocabulary of game theory, the financial analysts’ focus on RoACE-benchmarking has 
served as a focal point
2 for the international oil companies, securing cartel stability. We will 
illustrate this by a very simple example. Say the oil industry consisted of only two companies that 
were to select one of two strategies: exploration (for growth) or passivity (for short-term 
profitability).
3 A possible payoff matrix for the game could be: 
 
Table 1. Payoff matrix in simplified capacity game. 
 
      Company 2   
      Passive  Explore 
Company 1   Passive 125,  125  75, 150 
   Explore  150, 75  100, 100 
 
  
The numbers in each cell give the payoff to company 1 and 2, respectively. Observe that there is 
a strategic interaction between the companies’ payoff to company 1 depends on the actions of 
                                                 
2 Schelling (1960). 
3 For a good overview of game theory, see Gibbons (1992).   5
company 2, and vice versa. The outcome where both companies invest, generate high production 
capacity, thus increasing the likelihood of a fall in oil prices. The payoff in this case is 50 to each 
of the companies. If they instead were able to coordinate an outcome with lower capacity, oil 
prices and profits would be higher (100 to each of the companies). The problem with this 
outcome is that it usually does not represent a stable equilibrium. The reason is that each of the 
companies has an incentive to invest at high prices. If one company is not investing it will be 
profitable for the other firm to invest, thus benefiting from the higher oil price. But since 
investing is the dominant strategy of both companies, the typical Nash-equilibrium is the low-
price/high-investment case, where both companies have low profits of 50.  
  In deciding on its investment levels, an oil company faces a trade-off between the short-
term gain of high investments (and high production volumes) in periods of high prices against 
even-higher long-term profits if both companies were to abstain from additional capacity 
expansion. Most oil companies have a high required rate of return, which would indicate that they 
would opt for the short-term strategy of capacity expansion. However, the stock market analysts’ 
system of relative valuation - and emphasis on RoACE - introduces a countervailing incentive, as 
high investments would generate a temporary decline in RoACE due to the features of the 
accounting system. Thus, focus on short-term financial indicators (a focal point) may have the 
interesting effect of supporting an equilibrium of low investments, which otherwise typically is 
characteristic for companies having low discount rates. 
To understand the shift in strategy by the oil companies, towards a stronger focus on 
short-term rate of return, it is useful to examine the development of share prices among oil and 
gas companies, relative to other industries.  
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Figure 2: Stock price development for oil companies (Amex OIX) and  
general index (S&P500), 1991-2004.  Source: EcoWin. 
 
In Figure 2 wee see that the value of oil stocks fell when oil prices started to fall in 1996, but not 
to the same extent as the reduction in oil prices One reason could be that the market generally 
expects the oil price to return to its historical average (mean reversion). The low oil prices, 
reaching 10 dollars per barrel in 1998, have probably affected the later decisions by international 
oil and gas companies in terms of low price assumptions in investment analyses.
4  International 
oil and gas companies have been slow to update price expectations in the aftermath of 1998.  
Temporary financial distress led to a stronger focus on cost discipline and short-term 
profitability. When oil prices rose strongly after 1998, the stock market response was muted, and 
oil and gas stocks general underperformed the general market development. One significant 
reason for this development was the so-called “new economy”. The IT-bubble of the late 1990s 
made it hard to raise money for conventional risky investments like oil and gas exploration. 
                                                 
4 The very strong focus on cost discipline in the oil industry in the last decade should also be seen in context with 
over-investment in exploration in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s.    7
Moreover, the relative low value of oil stock made acquisition costs for reserves lower than 
finding and development costs, thus capping the potential for organic growth.
5 
 
3. RoACE over a project’s life cycle 
 
Accounting returns do not always reflect internal rates of return. With the system of depreciations 
in the oil industry, unit of production depreciation, accounting returns are lower than internal 
rates of return when investment activity is higher than usual (or for a firm with many new 
projects in its portfolio). When investments are low (or for firms dominated by legacy assets), 
accounting returns are higher than internal rates of return. Only at an average investment level (or 
a balanced portfolio of old and new projects) do accounting returns reflect the internal rate of 
return. For the oil industry, characterised by large and lumpy investments with long lead times, 
this is a challenge. It may be hard to get investment funds to good projects in periods where 
companies are lagging behind their RoACE targets. 
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Figure 3: Illustration of RoACE-contribution over a project’s life cycle.  
Data: Model field from the Norwegian continental shelf. 
 
                                                 
5 See Antill and Arnott (2002).   8
In Figure 3 we provide a simple illustration of how a new project contributes to the RoACE of a 
small company. The project is a small satellite development on an existing field on the 
Norwegian continental shelf, requiring relatively small investments and having a very short lead 
time. For a large company this would have a negligible effect on the RoACE of the entire 
portfolio (large projects or groups of smaller projects, however, may have a significant impact on 
RoACE). For illustration purposes, therefore, we have constructed a synthetic portfolio of a small 
company, consisting of the project and some fixed income. Figure 3 clearly illustrates that the 
new project will have a negative impact on RoACE in the first years, and thereafter contribute 
well. Note that this can be seen as a best case for the initial negative impact on RoACE. Larger, 
stand alone development projects have considerably longer lead times, and hence a longer period 
of negative RoACE impact. Exploration projects, of course, is even worse in this respect, and 
may be hard to sell in periods of strong short-term focus. 
 
4. Financial indicators used in the oil industry 
 
Being a successful stock market analyst can be very rewarding, but is indeed also demanding. 
One single person often has to keep track of a wide range of companies, and provide superior 
advise and consistent investment recommendations to exacting investors with no concerns but to 
maximise their returns and to outperform their benchmarks. No wonder, therefore, that both 
analysts and investors have to relate to some simplified indicators that can help them in 
developing relative valuations and investment rankings. 
  Ideally, valuation should be undertaken by means of net present value analyses. The value 
of a firm is then determined by the cash flow, growth and risk characteristics. As analysts lack the 
necessary data to do such analyses in a proper manner (asymmetric information), they often 
resort to relative valuation, in which estimated firm values are based on how similar assets are 
currently priced in the market. According to Damodaran (2002), the use of relative valuation is 
widespread. The reasons are that valuation based on multiples can be completed with far fewer 
explicit assumptions and far more quickly than a discounted cash flow valuation. Furthermore, 
relative valuation is simpler to understand and easier to present to clients. Finally, relative 
valuation is much more likely to reflect the current mood of the market, since it is an attempt to 
measure relative and not intrinsic value.      9
  First we give a brief presentation of the relation between cash flow valuation and 
valuation by use of multiples. Discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis, which is widely accepted as 
the ideal theoretical valuation model, can be used to derive valuation multiples such as the price-
earnings ratio (P/E) and the enterprise value-free cash flow ratio (EV/FCF). The value of a stable 










where WACC denotes weighted average cost of capital and g  is the growth rate of the cash flow. 










While pre-tax cash flow measures such as EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation 
and amortization) are commonly used in other sectors, they lack relevance in the oil and gas 
industry as tax rates differ substantially. Hence, the analysts use a so-called debt-adjusted cash 
flow measure (DACF), which in its simplest form is a post-tax EBITDA. The free cash flow to 
the firm can be written in terms of DACF: 
 
(3)   FCF = (EBIT (1-t) + DD&A)  – (Capex + ∆ Working capital),  
 
where DD&A is depreciation, depletion and amortization, capex is capital expenditure and t is 
the tax rate on operating income. 
Defining (EBIT (1-t) + DD&A) as DACF and (Capex + ∆ Working capital) as long-term 
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Since DACF can be viewed as the funds available for investments (short term and long term), 
debt repayment and distribution to shareholders, the numerator in the term on the right hand side 
of the equation, (1-investments/DACF), can be interpreted as the ratio of funds available for 
repayment of debt and distribution to shareholders. In other words, EV/DACF is positively 
related to the fraction of available cash flow distributed to debt and equity holders. Note that this 
relation only applies if all other things are kept equal, i.e., the company remains a stable growth 
firm. It does not apply, e.g., if increased distribution to equity holders were to negatively affect 
growth. From the denominator on the right hand side of equation (4) we see that the valuation 
multiple EV/DACF is increasing with the growth rate in the company’s cash flow and decreasing 



















Figure 4: EV/DACF and RoACE ranking for international oil companies, for 2003.  
Data source: Deutsche Bank.  















































In Figure 4 we list EV/DACF and RoACE for some international oil companies, ranked 
according to RoACE. Such benchmarking by investment banks makes oil companies focus on the 
development in their RoACE-figures. Note that the relation between EV/DACF and RoACE in 
the diagram is not clear-cut. 
A crucial issue for valuation analyses, of course, is to determine the key indicators that 
may cause valuation multiples to vary across firms in the same sector. For the international oil 
and gas industry, the most common financial indicators and valuation benchmarks are Return on 
Average Capital Employed (RoACE), unit cost, production growth, reserve replacement rate, and 
average tax rate. These indicators can be perceived as a simplified implicit incentive scheme 
presented to the oil firms by the financial market. In responding to these incentives, the 
companies need to strike a balance between short-term goals of return on capital and medium- to 
long-term goals of production growth and reserve replacement.   
RoACE is usually defined as net income adjusted for minority interests and net financial 
items as a percentage ratio of average capital employed, where capital employed is the sum of 
shareholder’s funds and net interest-bearing debt. DACF, or debt-adjusted cash flow, normally 
reflects after-tax cash flow from operations plus after-tax debt-service payments; where after-tax 
cash flow is the sum of net income, depreciation, exploration charge and other non-cash items. 
Given the data that is available for external analysts, it is common to use market 
comparative multiple analyses. Cash flow multiples stand out as especially important in this 
respect, and one widely used indicator is the relation between enterprise value (EV) and debt-
adjusted cash flow (DACF) – or EV/DACF. An estimate for the value of a company, P, is thus 
found by taking the mid-cycle DACF for company i and multiplying it with the multiple for the 
comparable companies (peer group), EV/DACF . Thus, Pi=(EV/DACF)xDACFi. Positive 
investment recommendations are awarded to “cheap” companies, where valuation estimates go 
beyond current market capitalisation. On the other hand, cautiousness is usually recommended 
for the more “expensive” companies, where simple valuation estimates fall short of their market 
capitalisation. 
 In  their  Global Integrated Oil Analyzer, UBS Warburg states: “Our key valuation multiple 
is EV/DACF”. The key arguments are that it is an after-tax value (important in an industry with   12
substantial resource rent taxes) and that it is independent of financing decisions (thus facilitating 
comparisons between companies with different capital structure).   
UBS Warburg also appreciates the influence of oil price volatility on their analysis, and 
tries to focus on variables that can be influenced by management – i.e. production and unit costs. 
For valuation purposes, they therefore concentrate on what they call mid-cycle conditions. Given 
the considerable volatility in oil and gas prices, this is clearly important for the international oil 
and gas industry. For a given year, UBS Warburg identifies a clear relationship between RoACE 
and the EV/DACF multiple, and conclude:  
 
 “Each of the stocks which we rate a ‘Buy’ is trading below the average level relative to its 
returns. EV/DACF versus RoACE provides the key objective input into the process of setting our 
target prices.”  
 
Similar statements about valuation, multiples and return on capital are made in Deutsche Bank’s 
publication Major Oils.   
  In presentations of their valuation techniques, investment banks often picture the 
relationship between market capitalisation (or EV/DACF) and a single financial indicator (like 
RoACE) in a diagram. They typically show this relationship for different companies at a given 
point of time. We take this approach a significant step further, by controlling for other variables 
that can influence the multiple – like reserves etc. Furthermore, we apply a panel data set that 
offers observations of the relationship over five years. This allows us to test the hypothesis that a 
firm’s reputation is among the most important factor in deciding the company’s value. Thereafter, 
we compare our findings with common analyst perceptions.  
 
5. Previous research 
 
In the following we present literature that specifically deal with valuation of oil companies.
6 
McCormack and Vytheeswaran (1998) point out particular problems in valuation of oil 
companies, since the accounting information in the upstream sector gathered and reported by oil 
and gas concerns, “does a distressingly poor job of conveying the true economic results”. There 
                                                 
6 For general analyses of valuation multiples, see Damodaran (2002), and  Liu, Nissim, and Thomas (2001).   13
are measurement errors in petroleum reserves. There is an asymmetric response to new 
information; bad news is quickly reflected in the reserve figures whereas good news takes more 
time to be accounted for. Moreover, reserves may be exposed to measurement errors since they 
are noted in current oil price (and not the mid cycle price), and since they do not include the 
value of any implicit real options. Finally, McCormack and Vytheeswaran claim there is a bias in 
the reported figures, as the large and profitable oil companies are more conservative in their 
reserve estimates. This is a factor that can explain the importance that many analysts put on 
company reputation. However, this assumption has perhaps also become questionable, after the 
recent reserve write-down in Royal Dutch/Shell.  
As for depreciation, with the successful efforts method initial depreciations are too high. 
The unit of production method also has the effect of depreciating the assets too quickly. The 
effect may easily be to punish new activity and reward passivity. Other measurement challenges 
specific to the oil business are cyclical investment patterns and long lead times, which may 
exacerbate the measurement errors. We may have similar effects from the fact that discoveries 
are discontinuous and stochastic. 
  McCormack and Vytheeswaran (1998) perform econometric tests on financial relations 
for the largest oil companies for the period 1997-2001. Change in shareholder wealth is tested 
against EBITA, RONA, after-tax earnings, ROE, and free cash flow. The relations between 
valuation and financial indicators were found to be very weak or non-existent. Stronger relations 
were established by introducing Economic Value Added (EVA
7) and reserves.  
Antill and Arnott (2002) address the strategic dilemma between return on capital and 
growth in the petroleum industry. They claim that current RoACE-figures of some 15 per cent are 
due to the fact that the companies possess legacy assets that have low book values but still 
generate a considerable cash flow. If market values of the capital employed were applied, they 
estimate that the rate of return would fall to approx. 8-9 per cent, being more consistent with the 
cost of raising capital. One problem with RoACE, they add, is that capital employed will always 
reflect a mixture of legacy and new assets. The implication is that RoACE does not adequately 
reflect incremental profitability.
8 Thus, it falls short of being a good measure for current 
performance. Antill and Arnott (2002) argue that the oil companies should accept investment 
                                                 
7 EVA is a trade mark of Stern Stewart & Co. 
8 Using measures as RoACE thus favors companies having a large fraction of legacy assets in their portfolio.   14
projects with lower internal rate of return (IRR), as the growth potential would add value to the 
companies.  
Chua and Woodward (1994) perform econometric valuation tests for the American oil 
industry, 1980-1990. They test P/E-figures for integrated oil companies against dividend payout, 
net profit margin, asset turnover, financial leverage, interest rate, and Beta. However, they fail to 
uncover robust relations in the data set. The estimated interactions are weak, and some of them 
even have different signs than expected. Chua and Woodward do not find support for the P/E-
model. They therefore go on to test the stock price against cash flow from operation (following 
year and preceding year), dividend payout, net profit margin, total asset turnover, financial 
leverage, interest rate, Beta, and proven reserves. Future Cash flow and proven reserves are 
statistically significant explanatory factors, thus offering support to a fundamental approach to 
valuation. An increase in proven reserves of 10% produced an increase in the stock price of 3.7%, 
in the model estimated by Chua and Woodward.  
 
6. Empirical specification and data set  
 
Our objective is to evaluate the current valuation techniques among stock market analysts and 
professional investors. Standard analyst reports usually illustrate/compute correlations obtained 
from a cross-section of companies for one year only. We expand the analyses by making use of 
time series data for a panel of companies. Our econometric approach also allow for a variety of 
explanatory factors in a simultaneous model. For example, it is interesting to test how market 
capitalisation is affected both by return on capital (RoACE) and the reserve replacement rate 
(RRR). Traditional bilateral correlation studies of EV/DACF may not give the full picture of 
value generation if there for instance is a negative correlation between RoACE and RRR. Our 
basic equation to be estimated is  
 
(5)   EV/DACF= a+bROACE+ε 
 
where a and  b are the parameters to be estimated, and ε is an error term. To investigate the effect 
of additional variables the model is expanded to 
   15
(6) EV/DACF=a+bROACE+cX+ε 
  
Here, X denotes a vector of additional variables that can influence EV/DACF. This vector may 
include reserve replacement, oil and gas production (as a proxy for company size), unit 
production cost, finding and development cost and various combinations of these in different 
specifications. The equations are estimated with OLS, where fixed effects are used to distinguish 
between the years when pooling the observations from different years into a panel. An error term 
is of course added to the specifications before estimation. 
  For this study, UBS Warburg have kindly provided us with a panel data for the period 














6.1 Lack of normalisation 
 
In a time series setting, performance evaluation of oil companies would have to adjust for the  




















































Figure 5:  Arithmetic average RoACE versus Brent Blend, 1997-02.
9 
 
volatilities of oil and gas prices. If a company is performing well, it is vital to know whether it is 
merely due to a favourable oil market sentiment, or if superior stock market performance can be 
attributed to real improvements in the company’s underlying operations. Such normalisation is 
crucial also in a cross sectional setting, since normalisation is necessary for comparing companies 
with different portfolios. Companies are not to the same extent exposed to refinery margins and 
price fluctuations for oil and gas. 
Some oil companies do publish normalised RoACE-figures. In these cases, normalisation 
procedures and mid-cycle market assumptions will vary across companies. Accordingly, most 
valuation analyses are based on non-normalised data. To account for the effect of price cycles, 
they instead emphasise mid-cycle market conditions, which may be seen as a related concept. 
Figure 5 indicates that non-normalised RoACE-figures have quite limited information 
value. Non-normalised RoACE does not seem to provide much beyond the oil price, in this 
particular time period. In 2001, however, the two figures depart and the spread has widened into 
2003. Similar departures might have occurred under previous price cycles. Note also that the 
diagram is on an aggregate basis, so the non-normalised return from individual companies might 
provide more information. Still, the benefits of normalised return figures should be obvious. 
                                                 
9 RoACE is in the UBS dataset defined excluding goodwill amortisation charges from the returns, but goodwill is 
included in capital employed.    17
 
7. Empirical results 
 
The multiple EV/DACF versus the return on capital indicator RoACE are essential to today’s 
standard valuation reports from stock market analysts. As a basis for valuation, UBS Warburg 
claims to identify a clear, positive relationship between RoACE and the EV/DACF multiple.  
This relationship is illustrated for the year 2002 in Figure 6. UBS Warburg is unlikely to 



















Figure 6: EV/DACF versus RoACE, 2002 
 
Our data set offers support to this relationship for all of the individual years 1997-2002, as 
reported in Table 2. However, the annual relationship between EV/DACF and RoACE is only 
weakly significant in the dataset, as the estimated parameter is never significant at a 5% level. 
The relationship is clearest for 2002. This is shown in Figure 6 and the estimated equation with t-
values in the parentheses is: 
 
(7)  EV/DACF = 1.904 (0.606) + 47.453 (1.885)* ROACE 
 
R
2 =  0.277 
 
ROACE is here weakly significant with a p-value of 0.069. For the other years the R
2 is lower and 
although the estimated parameter is positive it is never statistically significant at any conventional 
level.    18
Table 2. Year by year regressions of ROACE on EV/DACF 


























* t-values in the parenthesis 
 
We would like to take this further, to see if the relationship between EV/DACF and 
RoACE prevails over time, in a setting with multiple explanatory factors. With straightforward 
testing on time series data, we cannot establish any correlation between EV/DACF and RoACE. 
But here we need to take one step back and reflect on our input data. As explained above, we 
would have liked normalised RoACE-figures. Having only non-normalised return on capital 
figures at hand, we have to address the issue of oil price fluctuations. With oil companies being 
priced at mid-cycle oil prices, one would have to assume a strong relationship between the 
multiple EV/DACF and the oil price, as revealed in Figure 7. When the oil price is very high, the 
market expects it to fall (mean reversion) and, accordingly, a low multiple is the result. The 



































Figure 7:  Oil price sensitivity. EV/DACF versus Brent Blend, ExxonMobil,  
1997-2002 
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Consequently, we need to single out oil price volatility to isolate the true effect on valuation from 
underlying profitability, i.e., the effect of normalised RoACE. One way of achieving this is 
simply to include oil price in the regression. The coefficient pertaining to RoACE will then 
reflect the effect on valuation from normalised return on average capital employed. Since all 
international oil companies more or less face the same oil price in a given year, the inclusion of 
oil price in the regressions is analogous to including a year dummy across the panel. In all 
estimations using the panel over the 5 years, 2001 is used as the base year. Hence, the annual 
dummies are to be interpreted as the deviation from 2001.   
Introducing year dummies in addition to RoACE, we find from regression analyses on the 
panel data set that the year dummies are strongly significant whereas RoACE is weakly 
significant (p-value=0.068) in explaining the multiple EV/DACF; see Table 3. However, the 
explanatory power is still relatively poor with an R
2 of 0.26.  
 
 
Table 3. EV/DACF explained by ROACE and annual dummies 
Variable Coefficient  t-value 
Constant 4.833  2.367 
ROACE 22.178  1.869 
y97 1.465  1.011 
y98 4..764  2.913 
y99 3.094  2.078 
y00 -1.954  -1.408 
 
 
This is the only specification using the panel where ROACE is positive. With a p-value of 0.068 
the parameter is also statistically significant at a 10% level although not at a 5% level. Note that 
we find significant year effects, i.e., EV/DACF responds negatively to oil price, as in Figure 7. 
This supports the perception that oil companies are priced at mid cycle oil prices. 
We would like to examine the trade-off between short-term return (RoACE) and growth 
(reserve replacement rate, RRR). The results from this specification is reported in Table 4. The 
explanatory power for this specification is still poor with an R
2 of 0.28. RoACE is weakly 
significant, and with a negative sign. On the other hand, the RRR coefficient takes s the sign we   20
would expect, but is not significant in explaining valuation. Hence, the classical short-term, long-
term trade-off is not sufficient to generate a valid valuation model in the oil industry for the 
relevant period. One possible explanation to the fact that RoACE is only weakly significant, and 
with a negative sign, would be that the strong focus on RoACE in the years 1997-2002 has been 
at the expense of organic reserve replacement. The valuation multiple, therefore, has not 
responded favourably in response to high RoACE figures, since the investors have not perceived 
the higher returns to be sustainable. This explanation, however, of a stock market primarily 
concerned with long term potential, is not supported by our tests. 
 
Table 4. EV/DACF explained by ROACE, RRR, and annual dummies  
 
Variable  Coefficient  t-value 
Constant  4.0213 1.789 
RoACE  21.059 1.76 
y97  1.5087 1.038 
y98  4.6535 2.83 
y99  2.8929 1.915 
y00  -1.9709 -1.416 
RRR  0.81509 0.874 
 
 
Many analysts argue that company size plays an important part in pricing of international 
oil companies. Various practical and theoretical reasons have been provided to explain this fact. 
We will mention some of them. Larger companies may have a larger growth potential in their 
portfolios. Company size may have a positive reputational effect on governments’ discretionary 
licensing decisions for oil and gas deposits. Large and prospective operatorships, which also are 
skill and resource demanding, are often awarded to the largest companies. A larger opportunity 
set in terms of geological deposits may also allow large firms to pursue a cream-skimming 
strategy. Finally, the largest international oil companies have the best opportunities to pursue tax 
shifting. On the other hand, large companies may be slow and face higher co-ordination costs, 
and may miss out on benefits of focusing strategies and specialisation. 
 
Table 5. EV/DACF explained by ROACE, O&G, RRR, and annual dummies  
Variable  Coefficient t-value 
Constant  7,4245 5,004   21
ROACE  -17,936 -1,998 
y97  0,22061 0,236 
y98  1,8699 1,706 
y99  1,0131 1,03 
y00  -0.56823 -0,633 
RRR  0,32697 0,551 
O&G  0,0019059 8,086 
 
 
We now investigate the effect of size on oil company pricing in our dataset, using total oil 
and gas production (O&G) as a proxy for size. The results are reported in Table 5. The 
explanatory power of this specification is substantially improved relative to the earlier 
specifications, as the R
2 is 0.72. We can see that size is a highly significant explanatory factor in 
the pricing of oil companies. Note that the sign of RoACE now is significantly negative. This 
may be due to a likely correlation between RoACE and O&G, to be explored below. An 
alternative explanation is that firms that improve their short-run profitability (RoACE) do so by 
scarifying their long-run potential (RRR), and are accordingly punished by investors. With unit of 
production depreciations, which is the accounting standard, new investments imply a temporary 
decline in RoACE. 
 
Table 6. EV/DACF explained by ROACE, F&D, O&G, RRR, UPC and annual dummies. 
Variable Coefficient t-value 
Constant 10.183 3.808 
ROACE -19.230 -2.074 
y97 0.149 0.156 
y98 1.622 1.387 
y99 0.660 0.642 
y00 -0.681 -0.745 
O&G 0.002 7.046 
F&D costs  -0.021 -0.357 
RRR 0.136 0.178 
UPC -0.526 -1.310 
 
We proceed by including the potential explanatory factors finding & development costs (F&D) 
and unit production costs (UPC). The results for this specification are reported in Table 6. The 
explanatory power does not improve much, as the R
2 is 0.73, which is not too surprising given   22
that none of the parameters on the new variables are statistically significant. Note that the 
perceived relationship between EV/DACF and RoACE remains negative and statistically 
significant. This might not be so surprising, after all. Production volumes and unit costs affect 
return on capital and can be influenced by the companies and their management. They are 
therefore likely to be correlated with RoACE. The implication is that the specific effects of these 
variables can be hard to identify econometrically. More specifically the effect of RoACE on 
EV/DACF may be crowded out by the underlying return on capital variables.  
    
Table 7. RoACE explained by F&D, O&G RRR, UPC and annual dummies  
Variable  Coefficient t-value 
Constant  0.12735 3,152 
O&G  1.46E-05 3,916 
F&D_costs  0.0011241 1,141 
RRR  0.01112 0,868 
UPC  -0.0050038 -0,744 
y97  -0.045242 -3,133 
y98  -0.083414 -5,652 
y99  -0.057084 -3,847 
y00  0.033583 2,321 
 
 
To look further into the potential correlation between RoACE and the other explanatory factors, 
we try to explain RoACE by these factors. The results for this specification are reported in Table 
7. The explanatory power is relatively good, with an R
2 of 0.72. We see that size, represented by 
O&G, is a highly significant explanatory factor together with the annual dummies. F&D, UPC 
and RRR are not statistically significant. Hence, it seems like it is primarily the firm size and the 
oil price that are explaining the variation in RoACE. 
 
 
Table 8. EV/DACF explained by O&G, F&D, RRR, UPC, annual dummies, and company 
dummies 
 
Variable Coefficient  t-value 
O&G 0.0010499 0.77 
F&D_costs -0.010579 -0.163 
RRR 0.11513 0.127 
UPC -0.59148 -0.963   23
Hess 7.7361 2.607 
BP 11.726 2.359 
Chevron 8.5612 1.959 
ENI 7.2749 2.348 
Exxon 9.2843 1.467 
Hydro 7.2656 2.765 
Occidental 9.8837 3.53 
PetroC 7.3789 3.046 
Repsol 9.6002 3.042 
TotalFinaElf 8.6209 2.287 
Y97 0.7743 0.865 
Y98 2.9693 3.487 
Y99 1.6338 1.91 
Y00 -1.3472 -1.717 
 
 
To investigate the effect of the firm’s reputation, we now run EV/DACF against the various 
explanatory factors, excluding RoACE, but including company dummies. The results for this 
specification are reported in Table 8. The explanatory power is now very high, with an R
2 of 0.98. 
In this regression each company has its own constant term, where a large constant term indicates 
a higher EV/DACF for that company that cannot be attributed to any of the other factors. Note 
that this ranking of company effects deviates from traditional EV/DACF rankings, where the 
largest companies tend also to have the highest multiples. Occidental has the highest company 
effect, and a company like Hydro outperforms Exxon. With the inclusion of  O&G in the 
regression, we have accounted for the effect of size, and by this isolated reputation effects beyond 
size. It is worthwhile to note that none of the explanatory variables with the exception of the firm 
and annual dummies are significant. When testing whether these parameters jointly are zero, we 
get an F(4,32) statistic of 20.362. With a p-value of 0.834, we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
these factors should be excluded from out model. 
 
Table 9. EV/DACF explained by annual dummies and company dummies 
 
Variable Coefficient  t-value 
Hess 5.536 6.370 
BP 13.396 15.414 
Chevron 8.836 10.167 
ENI 6.316 7.267 
Exxon 11.836 13.619 
Hydro 5.736 6.600 
Occidental 7.936 9.131   24
PetroC 5.756 6.623 
Repsol 7.616 8.763 
TotalFinaElf 9.236 10.627 
Y97 0.400 0.545 
Y98 2.991 4.071 
Y99 1.850 2.519 
Y00 -1.223 -1.661 
 
 
In Table 9 we report the results when explaining EV/DACF only by firm and annual 
effects. We then get the traditional result that the largest firms have the most significant company 
effects. The explanatory is still high, with an R
2 of 0.98. BP and ExxonMobil have by far the 
highest scores. That is, all things equal, ExxonMobil and BP trade at a premium to the rest of the 
industry.  
 















Figure 8:  Effects of company size and reputation on pricing of international oil companies. 
 
 
   25
Note that the simplified regression in Table 9, containing only year dummies (accounting 
for oil prices) and company dummies, have a very high explanatory power, and appears to be the 
model that best explains the companies’ multiples. This is somewhat surprising, as we are not 
able to pick up any effect of the variables that are thought to be the most important when valuing 
oil companies. A likely reason for this is, as argued by McCormack and Vytheeswaran (1998) , 
that the reported accounts often do not contain very much information, and it is necessary to 
adjust the accounts substantially to obtain accurate information about the true financial shape of 
the companies. As oil companies must have a long-run perspective, it is then only natural that 
with a relatively short data set as ours, the companies that have the best reserves and prospects in 
1997 is the same as in 2001, and that the firm effect is the most important explanatory factor. 
 
 
8. Conclusion  
 
Do low investments and high oil prices represent a sustainable equilibrium for the non-OPEC oil 
companies? The equilibrium rests on a vital assumption that return on capital employed (RoACE) 
is the main indicator when capital markets price oil companies. (Market analysts’ RoACE-
ranking of the international oil companies may have constrained new investments, as investments 
typically generate a temporary drop in RoACE.) To test this hypothesis we have undertaken 
regression analyses on market and accounting data from oil companies for the years 1997-2002. 
The objective is to ascertain key valuation drivers. The valuation multiple EV/DACF is tested 
against a number of financial indicators and dummy variables. Making use of year dummies in 
addition to RoACE, we find from regression analyses on the panel data set that the year dummies 
(reflecting the oil price) are strongly significant, i.e., EV/DACF responds negatively to the oil 
price. This supports the perception that oil companies are priced at mid cycle oil prices.  
The effect of RoACE on the valuation multiple, however, is not in accordance with 
common perceptions. In our multivariate specifications there is a significant negative relation 
between EV/DACF and RoACE. We have offered some possible explanations to this result. First, 
the RoACE figures used in external analyses (and in our regressions) are non-normalised. To 
evaluate performance we would have preferred to normalise for changes in refinery margins and 
petroleum prices. Such data, generated in a consistent manner, are not readily available. Second,   26
the RoACE figures suffer from the traditional shortcomings that financial accounts have in 
measuring true profitability (measurement errors). Third, in a multivariate econometric 
specification, the effect of short-term return on capital can be crowded out by interdependent 
explanatory factors. Fourth, the high RoACE figures in this period may prove to be non-
sustainable, as ambitious return on capital targets effectively reduce the investment capacity. The 
last explanation seems to be acknowledged by many of the international oil companies, as we 
now see less emphasis on RoACE and more emphasis on risk-taking and reserve replacement 
strategies in business plans. This indicates that the current low-capacity/high-price equilibrium is 
not sustainable.  
We obtain strongly significant company effects. To a considerable extent, these coincide 
with company size, where large companies obtain higher valuation multiples. In addition, we find 
a significant company reputation effect. A simplified valuation model that includes only year 
dummies (accounting for oil price) and company dummies (accounting for size and reputation) 
proves to have a very high explanatory power.  
  As indicated above, this paper is an early attempt to substantiate the links between market 
valuation and financial and operational indicators in the international oil and gas industry. The 
results are inspiring, but preliminary. We still have a long way to go, to develop high-quality data 
sets and uncover the true data-generating processes. Future research should be directed at the 
development of broader panels for a longer time-horizon. More degrees of freedom would allow 
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